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Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis[*]

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Of the various forms of research inspired by Harold Garfinkel's *Studies in Ethnomethodology* (1967), perhaps the most prominent has been the enterprise initiated by Harvey Sacks in collaboration with Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson that has come to be known as conversation analysis. While it has long been recognized that the initial development of conversation analysis was related to Garfinkel's ongoing program of ethnomethodological research, the precise nature of this relationship has only recently begun to receive attention within the literature. Heritage (1984: Chapter 8) reviews the central methodological principles and substantive findings of conversation analytic research within the framework of a broader discussion of ethnomethodology, although the relations between them remain largely implicit in his account. Schegloff (1992a) also touches on this topic in a wide-ranging discussion of Sacks' intellectual development that encompasses various influences on his work but does not focus on the ethnomethodological heritage per se. Our aim is to specify some central points of contact between ethnomethodological and conversation analytic forms of inquiry, although in the course of this discussion we will also touch upon some ways in which they differ.

Our primary objective presupposes that there are indeed continuities to be found between ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. This is a matter of some controversy, however, as scholars have recently devoted substantial attention to specifying points of divergence (Garfinkel and Wieder, 1992; Lynch, 1985: 8-10; Bjelic and Lynch, 1992: 53-55; Lynch and Bogen, 1990). As Schegloff (1992a: xii-xxvii) has noted, Harvey Sacks was influenced by a wide range of intellectual sources in addition to Harold Garfinkel. These include Erving Goffman (one of Sacks' teachers while a graduate student at Berkeley), Wittgenstein's ordinary language philosophy, Chomsky's transformational grammar, Freudian psychoanalysis, anthropological field work, and research by Milman Parry and Eric Havelock on oral cultures. Moreover, the subsequent development of conversation analytic research indicates that, in terms of both substance and method, it has a character and a trajectory that is partially independent of ethnomethodology. Substantively, ethnomethodology's broad concern with diverse forms of practical reasoning and embodied action contrasts with the conversation analytic focus on the

comparatively restricted domain of talk-in-interaction and its various constituent activity systems (e.g., turn taking, sequencing, repair, gaze direction, institutional specializations, and the like). Methodologically, Garfinkel's recent advocacy of investigators achieving the *bona fide* competence of an insider departs from the conversation analytic use of recorded data which anyone, whether a member of the setting or not, can inspect and review for its organizational features.

Despite these differences, bonds between the two approaches run deep. Garfinkel and Sacks had an ongoing intellectual and personal relationship that began in 1959 and was sustained through the early 70s (Schegloff, 1992a: xiii), a period when foundational research in both areas was being developed. Moreover, they co-authored a paper (1970) on an issue that is central to both ethnomethodology and conversation analysis: the properties of natural language use.[1] Given this extended relationship, it would be surprising if Garfinkel's ongoing program of ethnomethodological research did not inform the development of conversation analysis and vice versa. As we explore the two enterprises, however, we will see that their commonalities are not to be found in terms of specific topics of interest or methodological techniques, about which there are clear differences. Linkages are most evident at deeper levels where one can discern common theoretical assumptions, analytic sensibilities, and concerns with diverse phenomena of everyday life.

We will organize our discussion around these points of convergence between ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, first in overview and then with reference to more specific issues. Accordingly, we are not attempting a comprehensive review of either discipline, nor are we proposing a formal synthesis. Our discussion, in focusing on aspects of ethnomethodology which have been intertwined with the development of conversation analysis, is avowedly selective with regard to particular themes.

Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis in Overview

We begin with a brief and highly general characterization of the ethnomethodological program of theory and research.[2] Ethnomethodology offers a distinctive perspective on the nature and origins of social order. It rejects "top-down" theories that seek to explain social order in terms of cultural or social structural phenomena which are conceived as standing outside of the flow of events in everyday life. Adopting a thoroughly "bottom-up" approach, ethnomethodology seeks to recover social organization as an emergent achievement that results from the concerted efforts of societal members acting within local situations. Central to this achievement are the various methods which members use to produce and recognize courses of social activity and the circumstances in which they are embedded. The mundane intelligibility and accountability of social actions, situations, and structures is understood to be the outcome of these constitutive methods or procedures.

This distinctive perspective on the foundations of social order originated in Garfinkel's encounter with Talcott Parsons, with whom Garfinkel studied while a graduate student at Harvard (Garfinkel, 1988; Heritage, 1984: Chapter 2). In *The Structure of Social Action* (1937: 27-42) Parsons observed that members' sense of the world is necessarily mediated by conceptual structures; through such structures, otherwise "raw streams of experience" are ordered and rendered intelligible. Just as conceptual structures organize ordinary experience for lay members of society, they are also essential for scientific inquiry. Thus, Parsons held that a first step for social science is the development of a descriptive frame of reference capable of segmenting the complex flux of social activity. This involves analytically specifying certain abstract elements of action that permit empirical generalization and explanation (1937: 727-775). To this end, he developed the well-known "action frame of reference" consisting of the unit act, the means, ends, and material conditions of action, normative constraints on action, and the "analytic elements" or variable properties of action. Subsequent theorizing then focused on explaining patterns of social action by reference to institutionalized norms and more general value systems whose internalization ensures actors' motivated compliance with the normative requirements of society.

As a student and admirer of Parsons' "penetrating depth and unfailing precision," Garfinkel (1967: ix) nevertheless discerned a range of issues that were not addressed in Parsons' approach to the analysis of social action. For Parsons, research and theorizing proceeds from a prespecified analytic construct -- namely, the unit act and its components -- instead of those concrete actions that form the substance of the ordinary actor's experience of the world (Schegloff, 1980: 151; 1987a: 102). Correspondingly, Parsons' emphasis on how actors become motivated to act in normatively standardized ways diverts attention from the real-time process through which intelligible courses of action are produced and managed over their course (Heritage, 1984: 22-33). Finally, Parsons' analytic frame of reference forestalls appreciation of the indigenous perspectives of the actors themselves who, as purposive agents in social life, use forms of common sense knowledge and practical reasoning to make sense of their circumstances and find ways of acting within them. Indeed, it is through such reasoning practices, and the actions which are predicated upon them, that actors collaboratively construct what are experienced as the external and constraining circumstances in which they find themselves. Garfinkel's response was to place these matters involving the local production and indigenous accountability of action, matters which were peripheral for Parsons, at the center of an alternate conception of social organization.

While ethnomethodology thus embodies elements of a distinctive theory of social organization, that theory was not developed independently of empirical research. Indeed, it is a feature of the theory that propositions about social organization cannot be divorced from ongoing courses of inquiry in real settings. Since the intelligible features of society are locally produced by members themselves for one another, with methods that are reflexively embedded in concrete social situations, the precise nature of that achievement

cannot be determined by the analyst through a priori stipulation or deductive reasoning. It can only be *discovered* within "real" society (in its "inexhaustible details"), within "actual" society (in the endlessly contingent methods of its production), and within society "evidently" (in analytic claims that are assessable in terms of members' ongoing accounting practices) (Garfinkel, 1988). Accordingly, Garfinkel's theoretical proposals were developed in conjunction with his own empirical studies (1963; 1967), and they have inspired diverse streams of research which are united by the common goal of investigating a previously unexamined domain of social practice (for an overview, see Maynard and Clayman, 1991).

Like ethnomethodology, conversation analysis (henceforth, CA) adopts a thoroughly "bottom-up" approach to research and theorizing. Although conversation analysts are not averse to advancing theoretical claims, often of a highly general nature (Wilson and Zimmerman, 1980: 67), every effort is made to ground such claims in the observable orientations that interactants themselves display to one other. Within this framework, CA has developed its own relatively focused set of substantive concerns. While CA retains an interest in forms of common sense reasoning, these are analyzed as they are put to use within the specific arena of talk-in-interaction. Hence, conversation analysts have developed a distinctive interest in how various orderly characteristics of talk -- regular patterns of turn taking, activity sequencing, institutional specializations, and the like -- are accountably produced by interactants via procedures which are implemented on a turn by turn basis. Despite this focus it is clear that, at least in their broad contours, ethnomethodological and conversation analytic approaches to research and theorizing have much in common.

Methodological Continuities: Breaching Experiments and Deviant Case Analysis

The first specific point of contact to be discussed is methodological in character, and concerns the relationship between Garfinkel's early breaching experiments and what has come to be known as "deviant case analysis" within CA.

A methodological problem that Garfinkel initially faced was how to make forms of common sense reasoning available for empirical research. Within the phenomenological tradition, Schutz (1962) had emphasized that the constitutive operations of perception, cognition, and reasoning are normally taken for granted in everyday life. Actors confront a world that is eminently coherent and intelligible, and they adopt a thoroughly pragmatic orientation to their affairs in the world thus experienced. Within that orientation, common sense serves as a tacit resource for the pursuit of practical ends, but is not ordinarily an object of conscious reflection in its own right. Thus, Garfinkel (1967) wrote of the "seen-but-unnoticed background features" of social settings, features which are essentially "uninteresting" to the participants themselves. For the analyst, this creates what ten Have (1990: 29) has aptly

characterized as "the problem of the invisibility of common sense." How can "invisible" practices be made accessible to systematic empirical scrutiny?

As a first step, Garfinkel stipulated that although such practices may originate within consciousness, they are sociologically meaningful only insofar as they are consequential for, and are observable in, public forms of behavior (1963: 190). Hence, their analysis does not require a *verstehende* method, for they may be investigated exclusively by "performing operations on events that are 'scenic' to the person" (1963: 190). Moreover, Garfinkel proposed that the "scenic operations" that might best reveal the existence and nature of order-productive reasoning procedures are operations that, ironically, generate disorder rather than order. The strategy, as he put it, was:

> to start with a system of stable features and ask what can be done to make for trouble. The operations that one would have to perform in order to produce and sustain anomic features of perceived environments and disorganized interaction should tell us something about how social structures are ordinarily and routinely being maintained (1963: 187).

Garfinkel thus dealt with the invisibility of common sense by approaching the phenomenon indirectly in situations where it had ostensibly broken down. Successfully disrupted situations should enable one to infer the absence of some essential procedure and, by working backward, elucidate its constitutive import in normal circumstances. Thus, Garfinkel's ingenious solution to the problem of the invisibility of common sense methods was based upon the insight that they remain "invisible" only so long as they "work;" if they can somehow be inhibited or rendered inoperative, the entropic social consequences should be both predictable and observable.

In light of these considerations Garfinkel developed the well-known breaching experiments that would serve as "aids to a sluggish imagination" in the analysis of common sense (1967: 38). For inspiration as to what the procedures of common sense might consist of, he drew on Schutz' analysis of the assumptions which comprise "the natural attitude of everyday life" (1962; 1964; 1966) and Gurwitsch's discussion of the use of contextual knowledge in the manner suggested by a phenomenology of perception informed by Gestalt principles ([1959] 1966; 1964).[3] To inhibit these common sense and contextualizing procedures, he instructed his confederates to demand that subjects explain and clarify the meaning of their most casual remarks, to act as boarders in their own homes, to act on the assumption that subjects had some hidden motive, and so on. Although he was hesitant to use the term "experiment" in reference to such studies, preferring to characterize them more modestly as "demonstrations" (1967: 38), Garfinkel's approach was very much reminiscent of the earlier incongruity experiments of Asch (1946; 1951) and Bruner and his associates (Bruner and Postman, 1949; see also Bruner, 1961). Garfinkel's demonstrations, however, were designed to be not merely incongruous with subjects' expectations, but also massively senseless.

The experimental outcomes were indeed dramatic, although not precisely as Garfinkel initially anticipated. Instead of yielding a state of bewilderment or "cognitive anomie," subjects typically reacted with marked hostility, displaying acute anger, sanctioning the confederates, and attributing various negative motivations to them. The main exception to this pattern of hostility occurred when subjects departed from the order of everyday life and assumed that some extraordinary circumstance was operating -- for instance, some kind of game -- which enabled them to "normalize" the anomalous action as a move within a game. Taken together, these reactions served as evidence that societal members tacitly use and orient to these methods of reasoning in ordinary life. Moreover, the hostile reactions suggested that, within the domain of everyday life, sense-making procedures have an underlying moral dimension (Heritage, 1984: Chapter 4). That is, use of the procedures is not merely an empirical regularity, but a moral obligation that societal members enforce on one another; the procedures are treated as mutually relevant and binding. This moral orientation, which Garfinkel initially referred to under the rubric of "trust" (Garfinkel, 1963), constitutes a basic frame of reference in terms of which societal members encounter their fellows. Thus powerful sanctions can be mobilized against those who violate these relevances and the trust that they embody. Garfinkel concluded that

> The anticipation that persons *will* understand, the occasionality of expressions, the specific vagueness of references, the retrospective-prospective sense of a present occurrence, waiting for something later in order to see what was meant before, *are sanctioned properties of common discourse* (1967: 41) (emphasis added).

Since Garfinkel's early breaching experiments, ethnomethodologists have continued to pay close attention to disruptions of perceivedly "normal" states of affairs on the assumption that such events can illuminate otherwise invisible order-productive practices. However, more recent work has tended to avoid experimentally contrived disruptions in favor of seeking out disruptions that arise naturally and spontaneously within social situations. Garfinkel's own case study of Agnes (1967: Chapter 5), who "passed" as a female despite seemingly masculine elements of her anatomy and biography, is an early exemplar of a naturally occurring disruption. More recent examples include Pollner's (1975; 1987) use of reality disjunctures in traffic court to explore the parameters of mundane reasoning, Wieder's [1974] (1988) use of departures from official routines in a halfway house as a resource for exploring the reflexive relationship between norms and the instances of conduct that they are seen to regulate, and Lynch's (1982; 1985) use of research artifacts to explore the material and praxiological foundations of scientific findings.

Naturally occurring disruptions of seemingly "normal" states of affairs have also played an important role in conversation analysis, where investigators examine "deviant" cases as a routine methodological practice. Thus, after locating and initially describing some interactional regularity, analysts commonly search through their data for incongruous cases in which

the proposed regularity was not realized. For instance, in Schegloff's (1968) pioneering analysis of conversational openings, a single deviant case is central to his analysis, and he cites Garfinkel for the inspiration that normal scenes can be illuminated by considering disruptions of them (1968: 1077).

This is not to say that conversation analysts have straightforwardly imported this aspect of Garfinkel's method without altering it. In keeping with the naturalistic spirit of CA, and in concert with more recent ethnomethodological studies, disruptions are not engineered experimentally but are found by examining interactional records for spontaneously occurring instances. There are, of course, distinct advantages to this more recent approach. Beyond the obvious benefit of enhanced external validity, spontaneous disruptions are produced by ordinary actors themselves in accordance with thoroughly endogenous considerations. Accordingly, they can be analyzed as specimens of social action, as describable "doings" in their own right, rather than vehicles of social disorganization which are revealing of practices exogenous to the disruption itself.

Moreover, the conversation analytic use of deviant cases has expanded beyond its role in Garfinkel's experiments. For Garfinkel, the primary purpose of the breaching experiments was to test for and to explicate otherwise "invisible" constitutive procedures. Within CA, deviant cases often serve a similar function, but that is subsidiary to the more general goal of producing analytic formulations that can account for the widest range of instances within a corpus of data. Thus, "deviant case" in CA is generally an *analyst's* characterization which may or may not turn out to be, in addition, a characterization that the *interactants* might make; the term usually references events which seem to be inconsistent with an initial analytic formulation of how things work. Investigators aggressively search for such cases because serious consideration of them tends to enrich and deepen an initial analysis by making it account for both the regular patterns of talk as well as those singular instances that run off differently. In this respect, the methodology of CA is formally similar to what has elsewhere been termed "analytic induction," a qualitative research methodology that can be traced to Znaniecki's *The Method of Sociology* (1934) and which seeks to produce, through the systematic analysis of deviant cases, a relationship of perfect correspondence between an empirical phenomenon and the analytic apparatus postulated to explain its various manifestations within a corpus of data (Katz, 1983). Beyond this the similarity ends, for analytic induction has traditionally been concerned with the formulation of causal laws, while conversation analysis has a different objective: namely, to explicate the reasoning principles that guide, and are displayed within, interactional conduct.[4]

Conversation analysts typically deal with deviant cases in one of three ways, only the first of which is directly related to Garfinkel's approach. First, some deviant cases are shown, upon analysis, to result from interactants' orientation to the same considerations that produce the "regular" cases. In the analysis of adjacency pairs, for example, the regular occurrence of certain paired actions (e.g., question-answer, request-response, etc.) is explained by reference to the property of conditional relevance, which stipulates that the

production of a first pair-part makes a corresponding response both relevant and expectable (Schegloff, 1968; 1972; Schegloff and Sacks, 1973). How, then, do we account for instances where the relevant response was not immediately produced? In many cases it can be shown that even though the item was not produced then and there, the interactants were nonetheless acting in accordance with the assumption that it should properly be forthcoming. For instance, the recipient may provide an account to explain and justify the nonproduction of a relevant response; alternatively, if no account is forthcoming, the initiator of the sequence may after a pause attempt to elicit the relevant item and thereby "repair" the unfinished sequence. Also relevant here are "insertion sequences" (e.g., question-answer sequences intervening between an adjacency pair initiation and the called-for response) in which the recipient seeks to elicit information necessary to provide an appropriate response. In any case, through such actions the parties display an orientation to the very same principles that are postulated to underpin the production of straightforward adjacency pair sequences (Heritage, 1984: 248-53). This line of reasoning both confirms the initial analysis regarding conditional relevance and enriches it by showing how the same principles operate within, and thereby generate, a nonstandard course of action. Moreover, the line of reasoning is formally similar to Garfinkel's approach in the breaching experiments, where a proposed common sense procedure is confirmed and explicated by examining the consequences of its absence. And just as Garfinkel's demonstrations revealed a morality attached to sense-making procedures, departures from conversational procedures sometimes engender strong negative sanctions, suggesting that at least some of the latter also have an underlying moral dimension.

A second way of handling a deviant case is to replace the initial analysis with a more general formulation that encompasses both the "regular" cases and the "departure." Perhaps the clearest example of this can be found in Schegloff's (1968) analysis of telephone call openings. In a corpus of 500 telephone calls, Schegloff found that a straightforward rule -- "answerer speaks first" -- adequately described all but one of the call openings; in that 500th case, the caller spoke first. Rather than ignoring this instance or explaining it away in an ad hoc fashion, Schegloff argued that this case together with the other 499 could be explained in light of a prior interactional event and its sequential implications: namely, the ring of the telephone, which constitutes the first sequential "move" in any telephone interaction. A ringing phone functions as the first part of a summons-answer sequence, the components of which are linked by the property of conditional relevance. Against this backdrop, the "rule" that answerer speaks first actually reflects the more general principle that once a summons (in the form of a ringing phone) has been issued, an appropriate response is relevant. The deviant case can also be explained in light of the summons and its sequential implications; in that case the ring was followed by silence, which for the caller represented the absence of the relevant response, and this prompted the caller to speak first by reissuing the summons to solicit a response and thereby "repair" the unfinished sequence. Accordingly, the initial rule was shown to be derivative

of more general principles that were postulated to account for both the regular cases and the troublesome variant.

If these approaches fail, a third option is to produce a separate analysis of the deviant case, one which treats it as bringing about, in effect, an alternate sequential "reality." Thus, the investigator may describe how the apparent "departure" differs from the "regular" cases, analyze what distinctive activity is being accomplished in and through the departure, and specify how this seemingly atypical course of action alters or transforms the interactional circumstances. A prominent example here is Jefferson and Lee's (1981) analysis of departures from a proposed "troubles-telling sequence." When personal troubles are expressed in conversation, recipients commonly respond with affiliative displays of understanding. However, recipients may also offer advice and thereby transform the situation from a "troubles-telling" to a "service encounter" implicating different discourse identities and activities. This approach, unlike the previous two, does not result in a single analytic formulation which can account for both the "regular" and "deviant" cases. But it does embody an effort to come to terms with apparently atypical courses of action, and thereby incorporate such cases within a comprehensive analysis of the available data. And while this method is not directly related to Garfinkel's breaching experiments, the idea of sequential departures as context-transforming or "frame-breaking" activities is analogous to the way in which some subjects analyzed the breaches as moves to reshape the interaction as a "joke" or "game." It is also reminiscent of Goffman's observation that "a rule tends to make possible a meaningful set of non-adherences" (1971: 61), and his corresponding practice of analyzing such non-adherences in terms of the activities that are accomplished thereby. Within CA this approach has been used more frequently in recent years as researchers have begun to venture away from small, closely ordered sequences such as adjacency pairs and toward the analysis of larger episodes of talk which appear to be more loosely organized, are not sanctionable in the same way, and thus routinely permit a variety of sequential trajectories (e.g., Heritage and Sefi, 1992; Jefferson and Lee, 1981; Jefferson, 1988; Schegloff, 1986; Whalen, Zimmerman, and Whalen, 1988).

In summary, CA has developed a data-driven methodology that places a high priority on working through individual cases to obtain a comprehensive analysis of the available data. In several ways, coming to grips with deviant cases has been part of the methodology. While ethnomethodology has not been as committed to particular methodological strategies, at least one way of reasoning about deviant cases is deeply indebted to Garfinkel's insight that the common sense expectancies underlying perceivedly normal events can be illuminated by considering situations in which that normality is disrupted.

Natural Language as a Phenomenon:
Indexical Expressions and Sequential Organization

Both ethnomethodology and conversation analysis have been concerned with the use of natural language in everyday life. The capacity to categorize and describe persons, activities, and social situations is, of course, a central resource for the conduct of social scientific inquiry. However, this resource is by no means the exclusive province of the professional social scientist; it is derived from natural language capacities possessed by all competent members of society, capacities that play a pervasive and constitutive role in the everyday activities of both laypersons and professionals. For this reason ethnomethodologists of various stripes have sought to investigate what had previously been an unexplicated analytic resource. This theme arose early on in Garfinkel's work; his studies of jury deliberations (1967: Chapter 4) and psychiatric intake practices (1967: Chapter 6), as well as some of the breaching experiments discussed previously, came to focus substantial attention on the oral and written accounts produced by members in various settings. For Sacks this theme was even more central and is the primary focus of his earliest published writings (Sacks, 1963). Thus, he likened society to a machine that produced both a steady stream of *activities* and corresponding stream of *accounts* those activities, a machine with both "doing" and "saying" parts. He then criticized sociologists for excluding the "saying" part of the societal machine from analysis; that is, for producing more refined natural language accounts of activities without attempting to examine language practices as activities or "doings" in their own right. This attitude is broadly congruent with the ordinary language philosophy of John Austin, the later Wittgenstein, and their respective associates, although ethnomethodology developed independently and offers an empirical rather than a philosophical approach to the analysis of language practices.

The interest in natural language use came into focus for both Garfinkel and Sacks via the phenomenon of indexical expressions and their properties, which is the subject of their only published collaboration -- the oft-cited paper "On Formal Structures of Practical Actions" (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970). Garfinkel and Sacks characterize indexical expressions as utterances whose sense cannot be determined without reference to the person talking, the time and place of talk, or more generally the occasion of speech or its "context" (1970: 348-49). Examples include expressions containing what linguists call *deictic* words or phrases: pronouns, time and place adverbs like "now" and "here," and various grammatical features whose sense is tied to the circumstances of the utterance (Levinson, 1983: 54). Hence, the meaning and understandability of any indexical expression, rather than being fixed by some abstract definition, depends upon the environment in which it appears.

For philosophers concerned with the formal analysis of language, and for social scientists seeking to produce propositions about the organization of society, indexical expressions are treated as a nuisance to be remedied. Thus,

every effort is made to render scientific propositions (e.g., hypotheses, ideal types, interview schedules, coding formats, and so on) in abstract terms that will retain a determinate sense across the varied situations where such expressions are intended to apply. Despite these efforts, the best laid categories, descriptions, and explanations always leave something out, need fudging, or contain inconsistencies that remain to be addressed on an ad hoc basis. It seems that language is *necessarily* indexical, so that any attempt to remedy the circumstantiality of one statement by producing a more exact rendition will preserve that very feature in the attempt. The phenomenon is thus truly unavoidable (Garfinkel, 1967: 4-7).

Instead of treating the indexical properties of expressions as a nuisance to be remedied, an alternative approach is to examine them as phenomena. After all, however "flawed" indexical expressions may seem when semantic clarity is entertained as an abstract ideal, in everyday life societal members are somehow able to produce, understand, and deal with such expressions on a routine basis. Hence, Garfinkel and Sacks (1970: 341) argue that the properties of indexical expressions are ordered, socially organized, properties; such orderliness, moreover, "is an ongoing, practical accomplishment of every actual occasion of commonplace speech and conduct." As we shall see, far from being a problem, for lay members of society the indexical properties of everyday language can be a resource for broadly social ends.

What, then, comprises the orderliness of indexical expressions? As one instance, Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) discuss "formulations" through which members describe, explain, characterize, summarize, or otherwise "say in so many words" what they are doing or talking about. Formulations are socially organized in that they may arise when the determinate gist of a potentially multi-faceted conversation has become problematic, and they regularly invite confirmation or denial (Heritage and Watson, 1979). As another instance of the orderliness to indexical properties, Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) discuss "glossing practices" and a collection of examples. One of these is "a definition used in first approximation." An author, at the beginning of an article, may offer a loose definition of some term, subsequently developing arguments and exhibits to elaborate the definition. At the end, the author will supply a second and more precise definition of the term, which formulates the features and connections among the exhibits, arguments, and definitions (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970:364).

Neither formulations nor glosses, which are themselves indexical, can provide the essential means for rendering natural language expressions intelligible, however. Sacks [1967] (1992a: 720) takes up this very problem in his lectures on spoken interaction:

If... somebody produced an utterance and you figured that a way to show that you understood it was to produce an explication of it, then that explication would pose exactly the task that the initial utterance posed. And one can see how rapidly that would become an impossible procedure, and in any event would involve some sorts of

constant, and possible indefinitely extended "time outs" in a conversation.

While the sense of an utterance cannot be achieved solely via its explicative potentiality, i.e., from formulations or glosses, Sacks argues that the mechanism of tying one utterance to another through "pro-terms" is an economical way of accomplishing intelligibility (cf. Watson, 1987). Pronouns, which may refer to some other noun or category on whose behalf they stand, are characteristic tying devices, as are what Sacks [1967] (1992a: 717) calls "pro-verbs":

> an interchange like, "Did John and Lisa go to the movies last night?" "They did." There, via "They did," we have tying within a pair.

Tying practices provide for the accomplishment of mutually intelligible interaction in two distinct ways. On the one hand, utterances which are tied to previous ones may be understood by attending to the prior course of talk (Sacks, [1967] 1992a: 717-718). Thus, in the above example the referent of the pro-verb ("did") is readily available from what preceded it ("go to the movies last night"). But in addition to facilitating understanding, tying is also a crucial means by which interactants display their understandings of antecedent utterances to one another. Because pronouns and pro-verbs must be selected to fit what came before, the production of an utterance tied to some prior utterance "is the basic means of showing that you understood that utterance" (Sacks, [1967] 1992a: 718; see also Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson, 1974: 728-9). In short, by relating adjacent utterances to one another, interactants can efficiently understand such utterances, display their understandings to one another, and see that they were understood, all without recourse to formulations, glosses, or other regressive explications.

Tying is not the only means by which participants relate utterances to one another to provide for their intelligibility, because understanding interaction involves far more than grasping the lexical meaning of pro-terms or other deictic words. Also relevant is the issue of what a given utterance is *doing* in the service of some recognizable *social action*, such as insulting, requesting, apologizing, joking, reporting some item of news, or whatever. Interactants can relate utterances to one another in terms of the actions they perform; hence, by *positioning* their talk in relation to some antecedent utterance, or in relation to some larger interactional trajectory, interactants can accomplish identifiable activities. Thus, Sacks [1972] (1992b: 530) commented on how the positioning of an utterance can provide in part for what it is doing, due to the "why that now" orientation of interactants (see also Schegloff and Sacks, 1973: 313):

> ... consider for example, that when you say "hello" at the beginning of a conversation, the account for saying "hello" is that it's the beginning of the conversation. So by putting an utterance like that where you put it, you provide an explanation for why you said that

thing. And there are whole ranges of ways whereby parties position their utterances. By "position" I mean that they show, in an utterance's construction, that they know where they're doing it, and why they're doing it then and there.

The phenomena of tying and positioning imply that the *sequential features* of interaction are pervasively operative in the processes by which participants produce, understand, and exploit indexical expressions of every sort. In this sense, the conversation analytic investigation of sequential phenomena -- from simple adjacency pairs to the overall structural organization of a conversation -- can be seen as an extended analysis of the "ordered and socially organized" properties of indexical expressions that Garfinkel, in his own writings as well as his collaboration with Sacks (1970), nominated for study.

This domain of organization, moreover, is a thoroughly local and endogenous production, rather than, say, operating on behalf of some externally-based social structure, such as class, gender, or ethnicity. In that participants relate utterances to one another, a recipient who wishes to speak to whatever topic is on the floor is required to listen not just to some utterance-in-progress, but to the spate of previous talk, for it is in terms of this previous talk that the current utterance itself makes sense.[5] Additionally, when taking a turn of talk, a current speaker is required to demonstrate its relationship to an immediately previous utterance and, indirectly, to the utterances preceding it (Sacks, [1967] 1992a: 716-21).

Although sequential organization is a thoroughly local production, it is also a central means by which interactants, on a moment-by-moment basis, invoke larger interpersonal relationships and patterns of social "distance" and "intimacy" (Button, 1991; Goodwin, 1987; Jefferson, Sacks, and Schegloff, 1987; Maynard and Zimmerman, 1984). For instance, one can show that some current conversation is a developmental moment in the accomplished history of a relationship by connecting the current with a last meeting. Examples that Sacks [1970] (1992b: 193) provides are "You put up your hair" (as a remark when returning to somebody's house) and "How's your mother?", both of which show attention to "...that part of 'us' that is involved in our last interaction."[6]

Thus, in a variety of ways, utterances and their indexical properties provide a window through which to gaze upon the bedrock of social order. Actors produce mutually intelligible courses of talk, and achieve all manner of relationship, interdependence, and commitment (Rawls, 1989a) through the design and placement of single utterances in relation to the immediate environment of vocal and nonvocal activities. The investigation of this domain of organization is, then, one substantive bond between ethnomethodology and conversation analysis.

Since we started this section with a discussion of the Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) paper, it is appropriate to end there as well, for the paper also provides a clue as to what significantly differentiates ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, a subject that we will pursue further later on. While

the paper demonstrates that the properties of indexical expressions are achievedly ordered ones and thereby establishes a hitherto overlooked topic for sociological inquiry, it is mainly illustrative. How investigators are to decompose these indexical properties to lay bare the social organization of talk, and indeed what that organization might consist of, remains largely unspecified. This tendency toward illustration is characteristic of early ethnomethodology, and it encouraged many rediscoveries of what came to be called "indexicality," as well "reflexivity," "embodied action," and other core ethnomethodological concepts, in each new setting that the investigators entered (e.g., Baccus, 1986). Early textbooks, such as Handel's (1982: 40-45) and Leiter's (1980: 107-116) devoted entire sections to such topics. With regard to "indexicality," the textbook pattern was to show how it is an invariant feature of talk, and, following Cicourel (1974; 1981), to suggest that members' use their knowledge of the *ethnographic context* to understand otherwise ambiguous utterances. While this approach clearly demonstrated the pervasiveness of "indexicality" and the relation of talk to its context in a general way, it was less successful in setting forth a systematic program for explicating the orderliness of indexical phenomena.

Instead of relying on vague notions of "context" and relatively uncontrolled recourse to ethnographic description in the service of providing illustrative studies and demonstrations, Sacks identified a principle, that of sequential organization, which is pervasively implicated in the processes by which interactants exploit the indexical properties of utterances, achieve local understandings of them, and display such understandings to one another. This form of organization embodies investigable practices through which parties to an interaction precisely time and place their talk so as to both demonstrate one's heed for another's activity and to claim others' attention to one's own in the collaborative building of a course of action.

Having identified sequential organization as a phenomenon, conversation analysis also offers a programmatic way of studying interactionally situated language practices. In a sense, conversation analysis reverses the usual ethnomethodological practice of treating what have been "resources" for sociological inquiry (e.g., indexical expressions) as "topics" of investigation. Garfinkel and Sacks (1970), in arguing that the properties of indexical expressions are achievedly ordered, called attention to a previously unexamined phenomenon and thus made it available for sociological study. When Sacks went beyond this to identify a particular ordering principle -- namely, sequential organization -- he not only established this domain as a topic but provided a resource for continuing research into the turn by turn process by which members perform ordinary social activities. As research has progressed, the investigation of sequential phenomena has become an objective in its own right, and is now pursued in partial independence of the earlier ethnomethodological interest in indexical properties. The task of what Schegloff (1984: 50) refers to as "explicating the various sequential organizations of conversation, and interaction, and, importantly, their integration" has become a well-established program of research; conversation analysts are collectively engaged in the task of identifying types of sequences,

analyzing their organizational properties, documenting modifications in institutional settings, and the like. For the moment, then, we wish to note that Sacks initiated a more definitive and potentially cumulative empirical program than was previously available. That programmatic inquiries also might have inherent limitations is a matter to which we will return.

Achieved Organization: Rules and Sequential Organization

The empirical productivity of CA might seem to represent a fundamental departure from the analytic attitude of ethnomethodology, which has a strong "nonconstructive" or "deconstructive" character. Ethnomethodology may be understood as a form of inquiry which avoids making claims about the substantive character of social life, and investigates instead how social phenomena, whatever their character, are accountably achieved in local environments of action. It is because of this stance that ethnomethodologists have traditionally remained "indifferent" to the results of classical sociological research and theorizing (Garfinkel and Wieder, 1992: 186). Conversation analytic inquiry, by contrast, does seem to render positive characterizations of social phenomena, characterizations that encompass not only the underlying *processes* of interaction but its accountable *products* as well. Research on turn taking, for example, began by specifying the organization of turn taking in ordinary conversation (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson, 1974), and this has served as a foundation for investigating patterns of turn taking in a range of institutional settings, including classroom lessons (McHoul, 1978), trial examinations (Atkinson and Drew, 1979), news interviews (Greatbatch, 1988), and doctor-patient interactions (Frankel, 1990). Correspondingly, descriptions of specific sequences and their organizational properties continue to accumulate.

These developments have generated unease among some ethnomethodologists; in particular, turn taking analyses have been criticized for their formalism (cf., Liberman, 1985; Lynch, 1985: Chapter 5; Molotch and Boden, 1985; O'Connell, et al., 1990; Peyrot, 1982). For instance, Livingston (1987: 73) argues that descriptions of abstract rules for turn taking fail to capture the embodied work by which conversationalists exhibit and ensure that their talk is accountably being done turn-by-turn. We shall argue that although conversation analytic inquiries are in a sense "constructive" and seek to produce formal descriptions of interactional structures, such inquiries show continued attention to the situated practices through which interactional structures are incrementally achieved. This focus on achieved organization thus represents another point of contact between ethnomethodology and conversation analysis.

Within ethnomethodology, the emphasis on achieved organization is perhaps clearest in studies that challenge rule-based models of social action characteristic of classical sociological theory and research (Wilson, 1970). This aspect of ethnomethodology has been extensively discussed elsewhere (e.g., Heritage, 1984: Chapter 5; 1987: 240-248; Maynard and Clayman,

1991: 390-91), so we will only briefly review some of the main issues involved. Garfinkel has consistently criticized the received view propounded by Parsons and others that norms, conventions, or other rules of conduct operate as explanatory agents in the determination of courses of action. A major difficulty with normative theories of action lies in the unresolved relationship between abstract rules and the concrete real-world circumstances in which societal members must act. While rules provide rather general formulations of appropriate conduct, social situations have idiosyncratic features which distinguish them from one another. This raises the problem of how actors come to know whether the particular situation in which they find themselves falls within the domain of a given rule, and hence whether that rule should relevantly come into play. This problem is irremediable in just the way in which indexical expressions are irremediable; no matter how elaborate a normative formulation might be, it cannot encompass all possible circumstantial contingencies. This problematic is the focus of Garfinkel's discussion of the followability of coding instructions (1967: 18-24), in which he observes that coders' decisions are inevitably contingent on a range of ad hoc considerations which are not specified in the coding rules and which cannot be eliminated by elaborations of those rules. Similarly, jury decisions concerning guilt or innocence are not determined by prespecified legalistic criteria (Garfinkel, 1967: Chapter 4).

It would be incorrect to conclude from this that rules are irrelevant to the organization of social action. For societal members, social life is experienced as anything but arbitrary; activities are generally perceived as highly patterned and regular, and such regularities are frequently explained by members in terms of norms of various sorts. Garfinkel treats the apparent rule-governedness of action as a phenomenon, an endogenous achievement in which rules serve not as causal agents in the determination of action but as resources that members use when making sense of action. Here, Garfinkel's discussion of the documentary method of interpretation (1967: Chapter 3), which specifies how particulars and contexts within a perceptual field mutually elaborate one another, may be applied to understand the co-constitutive relationship between rules of conduct and situated actions (Zimmerman, 1970; Wieder, [1974] 1988). For jurors, or coders, or anyone in "common sense situations of choice," rules of various sorts provide for the intelligibility and accountability of social action. As members assemble and orient to relevant aspects of the circumstances at hand (e.g., the categorical identities of the interactants, the type of social or institutional setting in which they are situated, etc.), they understand and describe actions in terms provided by the norms and conventions which are presumed to be operative within those circumstances. In some cases, actions may be accountable as deviations from those rules, and are supplied with "secondarily elaborative" explanations (Heritage, 1987: 246) involving special motives or other contingencies. For both perceivedly "normal" and "deviant" actions, then, norms play an important role in the process by which members grasp what a given behavior is "doing." Moreover, by persistently accounting for the range of actions within a setting either in terms of some primary norm or a range of exceptional circumstances,

that norm is preserved across "entropic" events which might otherwise threaten its experiential reality (Heritage, 1987: 246-247). A rule, therefore, does not stand outside of social settings as an exogenous ordering principle, and it cannot in itself provide for the orderliness of social life. Rather, rules are used and applied by societal members themselves (together with other ordering practices) within social settings as a way of making sense of and explaining their own activities. It is this situated accounting work that particularizes and reconciles abstract rules with the details of actual conduct and thus provides for the maintenance of accountable patterns of social life.

Against this backdrop, conversation analytic findings -- such as procedures for turn taking, various sequence organizations, and the like -- may at first glance seem to be rule-like formulations of proper interactional conduct. Sacks may have unwittingly fostered this impression by his use of mechanistic metaphors; he often referred to "the technology" or "the machinery" of conversation and characterized his program of research as an attempt to isolate and describe "the machinery" through which interactions are generated (Sacks, 1984a: 26-27; 1984b: 413-414). However, this terminology was used metaphorically rather than literally, mainly in the context of lectures to students where it served a necessary pedagogical function. Sacks was seeking to overcome the deeply entrenched tendency to view the details of interaction as random or disorderly, or to dismiss them as mere "manners of speaking." By means of the "conversational machinery" rubric, Sacks encouraged his students to assume the opposite; that is, to treat every interactional event, no matter how seemingly small or trivial, as a potentially orderly phenomenon. Perhaps indirectly, Sacks was also addressing his colleagues within the social sciences (e.g., 1984a: 22), who tended to neglect the study of talk-in-interaction in favor of what were generally perceived as "bigger" or "more important" issues. In anthropology and sociology, interest in the structural properties of cultures and social systems greatly overshadowed social interaction as an object of study, and the few attempts to take on the topic of social action (e.g., Weber, Parsons, and Bales) dealt not with concrete activities but with abstract typologies and properties of action that could be readily linked to structural, historical, or other "macro" levels of analysis. And within linguistics, the analysis of language as a formal, self-contained, system of competences (a la Chomsky) forestalled inquiry into how speakers acquire linguistic competences and put them to use in real circumstances. Accordingly, Sacks' use of the "conversational machinery" rubric must be viewed in the context of his efforts to justify inquiry into a domain that had been marginalized and was often regarded -- by both students and colleagues alike -- as a messy "garbage can" of errors, accidents, and random processes.

Conversation analytic investigations have sought to document the orderly, sequential structures of interaction, but in classic ethnomethodological fashion the locus of order is the situated work of the interactants themselves rather than abstract or disembodied rules. This emphasis is manifest in a number of ways, but perhaps the most fundamental is the familiar practice within CA of building analyses out of singular fragments of actual, naturally occurring talk.

Thus, Sacks has observed that although conversation analysts seek to specify the generic "technology of conversation,"

> we are trying to *find* this technology out of actual fragments of conversation so that we can impose as a constraint that the technology actually deals with singular events and singular sequences of events (Sacks, [1970] 1984b: 414).

Analysis thus begins with a given interactional form as it is enacted within, and thereby organizes, some concrete situation. By proceeding on a case by case basis, analysts approach a more general understanding of how the form operates across diverse situations. This way of working produces findings which are neither Weberian ideal types nor Durkheimian averages (Sacks, 1963), findings which can be reconciled with, and are thus answerable to, singular instances of conduct. Correspondingly, the approach specifies a given sequential form in terms of the situated practices out of which instances are composed, rather than in terms of pristine rules of conduct.

Hence, far from being immutable Platonic forms, the sequential structures of CA are comprised of flexible social practices which are highly sensitive to changing circumstances. In the analysis of deviant cases (discussed previously) substantial attention is devoted to courses of talk that *do not* run off canonically due to problematic local contingencies. Such cases reveal that interactants guide their speaking practices in accordance with, and as a constitutive feature of, the particular circumstances at hand, even as they sustain and reproduce more general interactional forms. For example, studies of turn taking have devoted extensive attention to cases where the parties find themselves to be talking in overlap (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson, 1974: 723-724; Jefferson and Schegloff, 1975; Jefferson, 1973; 1986; Lerner, 1989; Schegloff, 1987). Overlapping talk is plainly incongruous with the way in which turn taking is usually managed. It can also disrupt subsequent talk insofar as it interferes with a recipient's capacity to analyze and understand the talk in progress as a prerequisite for determining when and how to speak next (Schegloff, 1987). As it turns out, overlapping talk is by no means a rare event, but it is usually short-lived, in part because at least one of the parties will stop talking in mid-utterance, before a turn constructional unit is completed. Moreover, the speaker who emerges in control of the floor may subsequently take steps to retrieve what was lost in overlap (Jefferson and Schegloff, 1975; Schegloff, 1987). For example, the speaker may cut off and restart his or her turn in such a way as to absorb the overlap from a competing speaker and thus produce a full unit of talk unfettered and in the clear (Schegloff, 1987). These responses to overlapping talk operate to preserve the intelligibility of what is currently being said. In so doing, they also restore regular patterns of turn taking, but they do so only by momentarily disrupting -- through cut-offs and restarts -- the canonical progression of turn constructional units.

Speakers also abort and restart units of talk in other circumstances. Goodwin (1981: Chapter 2) has shown that when the speaker of a turn-at-talk

notices a recipient's gaze begin to wander, that speaker will frequently cut off and restart the turn-in-progress, a move that regularly prompts the intended recipient to gaze back toward the speaker. Hence, what might initially seem to be a speech error or disfluency resulting from a problem in the thought processes presumed to underly speech, is in fact a methodical social practice, one that has orderly consequences for ongoing patterns of turn taking and displays of recipiency.

Accordingly, interactants do not enact the turn taking system, or any organization of talk, in a mechanical fashion. While the preceding examples were drawn from studies of turn taking and gaze direction, studies of sequences exhibit the same concern with specifying organizational forms in terms of the situated practices through which they are enacted.[7] The analysis of deviant, problematic, or incongruous cases demonstrates that interactants inevitably act in ways that are sensitive to, and part and parcel of, emergent circumstances and conditions within the local environment of action.

Sequential structures of talk are achieved not only during problematic cases. From an ethnomethodological point of view, even courses of action which run off "routinely" must be regarded as "achievements arrived at out of a welter of possibilities for preemptive moves or claims, rather than a mechanical or automatic playing out of pre-scripted routines" (Schegloff, 1986: 115). To respecify interactional routines as achievements, there has been a strong emphasis on comparative analyses of various kinds: analyses which compare not only "canonical" with "deviant" cases, but also alternate ways of interacting in different contexts. As a consequence, analysts remain sensitive to what interactants do, as well as what they refrain from doing, in order to realize a given course of action.

Consider, for example, how interactants produce stories and other extended courses of talk involving multiple turn constructional units. Within ordinary conversation, story forms cannot be realized unless the turn taking system for conversation is modified to allow the story-teller (or in some instances two or more story-tellers; see Lerner, 1992) primary access to the floor for an extended period. This modification is set in motion when the speaker initially projects that an extended telling is forthcoming (for instance by producing a story preface; see Sacks, 1974). This is by no means the end of the process, however; also essential to the realization of a story are the other interactants, who align as story recipients (or take up other interactional identities in relation to the story; see Goodwin, 1984) by withholding a range of turn types (Sacks, 1974) and by engaging in specific forms of body movement and posturing (Goodwin, 1984) while the story is unfolding. Similarly, news interviews regularly consist of journalists asking questions and public figures responding (Greatbatch, 1988). However, since journalists often produce one or more statements as a way of leading up to the question, question-answer sequences are achieved only insofar as public figures withhold speaking in response to these statements until the question is delivered. This is just one instance of an "institutional" form of talk which is constituted in part by reductions in the range of practices which are available for use in ordinary conversation (e.g., Clayman, 1989; Heritage, 1985; Heritage and Greatbatch,

1991; Whalen and Zimmerman, 1987). In each of these cases, a given sequential form is constituted in part by the *systematic absence* of talk at points where such talk might otherwise be relevant.[8] These absences provide for the accountable achievement of the organizational form in question in two distinct ways. First, the absences show that the interactants treat each unit of talk as one component of a larger sequence-in-progress, and are thus oriented to that larger sequence-in-progress on a moment-by-moment basis. Secondly, such absences facilitate the realization of the sequence as an accomplished fact.

Finally, it should be noted that CA studies are not confined to cases where sequential forms are successfully achieved, maintained, or repaired. Substantial attention has also been paid to cases where such forms are subverted or transformed by interactants in pursuit of some local interactional work or objective. Thus, interactants may remain silent following a question or a summons as a way of accountably "snubbing" an interactional coparticipant (Schegloff, 1968). Or they may depart from standard turn taking procedures by beginning to speak a bit "early," before the current unit of talk is complete, as a way of displaying recognition or independent knowledge of what is being said (Jefferson, 1973). To take one final example, interactants may say "uh huh," which usually occurs *within* an extended story and serves as a display of passive recipiency, at the *completion* of a discourse unit, where it accountably "resists" a more substantive response (Jefferson, 1984). Also relevant here are cases where highly specialized institutional forms of talk "break down" in spectacular ways (Clayman and Whalen, 1988/89; Schegloff, 1988/89; Whalen, Zimmerman, and Whalen, 1988). In many of these cases the transformative action acquires its sense in part by reference to the organizational form from which it departs; for example, the production of "uh huh" cannot be heard as "resistant" unless the stronger forms of receipt are tacitly oriented to as potentially relevant.

It should now be apparent that while conversation analysts seek to isolate and describe sequential forms of a highly general nature, these forms are specified in terms of the concrete situated practices through which they are contingently realized, rather than in terms of abstract rules of conduct. Thus every effort is made to avoid general or ideal-typical characterizations of interactional procedures in favor of attending to specific instances as they unfold within, are shaped by, and in turn organize, concrete circumstances. Correspondingly, rather than treat any particular sequence of activities as a *fait accompli*, investigators seek, through comparative analyses, to remain alive to the various possibilities for action that branch out from successive junctures within interaction as it develops. By these various means CA, consistent with its ethnomethodological heritage, seeks to recover the constitutive processes involved in the production and maintenance of seemingly "natural" and "routine" conversational patterns.

Achieved Organization: Sequential Component Production

While CA retains a lively sense of sequential structures as achievements, what about the singular activities that comprise sequences? How are these activities assembled, recognized, and thus rendered consequential within a developing course of talk? This problem of sequential *component production* can be elaborated by juxtaposing two investigations of a most mundane event in daily life: the opening of a telephone call. As we have already noted, Schegloff's (1968) study of telephone openings revealed that they are managed through a distinct type of adjacency pair: the summons-answer sequence. Because the sequence components are linked by the property of conditional relevance, and because its completion projects further talk by the initiator of the sequence, this sequence enables parties to coordinate entry into conversation. Schegloff's elegant analysis demonstrates an achieved, unitary solution to the problem of coordinated entry that operates across a variety of settings, across vocal and non-vocal activities, and even across the duration of a single conversation. Nevertheless, there is further orderliness to conversational openings than a strictly sequential analysis provides. In addition to the logic and organization of sequences, there is also the question of how the actions that set sequences in motion (e.g., summonses) are recognizably constituted. This topic has been investigated within both conversation analysis and ethnomethodology, and the way it has been approached provides insight into further aspects of their relationship.

1. Conversation Analysis

Schegloff's early work on telephone openings (1968, 1970, 1986) focuses attention not only on summons-answer sequences and their sequelae, but also on summonses as phenomena in their own right. Thus, Schegloff (1968: 376) observes that the ringing of a telephone achieves the properties of a summons as a result of social and interactional processes.

> The activity of summoning is not intrinsic to the items that compose it; it is an assembled product whose efficacious properties are cooperatively yielded by the interactive work of both summoner and answerer.

Consider that "who" a ringing phone is summoning depends upon how an actor, in concert with others, forges the social environment in which that event occurs. This process can include:[9] (a) how one *categorizes and orients to* the environment -- as one's own office or home, or someone else's office or home, or a public domain, and so on; (b) the *spatial positionings and activities* of members of an office or household vis a vis one another and the telephone -- for instance, the person who is nearest to a ringing phone, or is not presently "working" or otherwise engaged, may be treated as the "summoned" party; (c) the *expectations* that result from relationships,

routines, and arrangements which enable one party to anticipate that the other will call one just here, just now -- for example, "my wife's parents call every Thursday night about this time"; (d) the *informings* that are available prior to or during the phone-ring, such as "Jane should be calling soon," or "That's Jane"; (e) whether one is using a phone and calling someone else, such that the ringing represents an "outgoing" summons on the other end of the line, or is merely in the vicinity of an inert phone that commences to ring with a bell or other noise that can be taken as an "incoming" summons.

Consider also that there is, loosely speaking, a "proper" number of rings to a summoning phone -- not too few and not too many -- which a summoned party and others may work to achieve (Schegloff, 1986: 118-119). Thus, in addition to those items listed above, (f) persons who are close by the phone often let it ring several times before answering. Apart from whatever psychological factors might lie behind this tendency, one interactional consideration is that quick-answering is something that can be topicalized, as in "you were sitting by the phone," or "waiting for someone to call," etc. Such topicalization can then taken on its own dynamic, requiring determinate effort to exit, and may well be avoided by allowing some rings to pass. Correspondingly, (g) persons far from the phone sometimes rush to it. Obviously, this is in part because the recipient knows that the caller might make the inference that no one is home and thus hang up before the connection is made. But multiple rings are also vulnerable to topicalization in the way that few rings are; there may be inquiries about where the summoned party was so that a call recipient has to explain the delay in answering, and thus answering a summoning phone "late" may also be something to avoid. Finally, (h) answerers sometimes await the end of a ring or until the next ring has just started before picking up the phone. In light of such observations, Schegloff (1986: 120) concludes that "the actually heard rings [of a summoning phone] are not a random or mechanical matter, but are the product of distinct and methodical forms of conduct by the participants" (Schegloff, 1986: 120).

There is, then, within conversation analysis, concern not just for sequencing and turn taking as such, but also for how the components of these organizations are socially assembled, orderly objects in their own right. However, with respect to conversation analytic work on component production, the preceding analysis of summonses is somewhat atypical, in part because it is based on research done in the late 1960s and early 1970s, before conversation analysis attained its present form. Thus, Schegloff combines conversation analytic methods based on recorded data with more traditional ethnographic data to shed light on how summonses are assembled. Sacks' early lectures on how members "do" specific activities so as to be recognizable as such, and his work on membership categorization devices, are similarly eclectic (e.g., Sacks 1972). More recent conversation analytic work on sequential component production entails a more sustained focus on naturally occurring practices which are available on recorded materials and transcripts of them. Some studies examine various details of utterance design as they figure in the achievement of specific activities (e.g., Boden, in press: Chapter 3;

Drew, 1984; Maynard, 1984: Chapter 3; Pomerantz, 1980; Schegloff, 1988; 1992b; Watson, 1990) and as they impart subtle nuances to activities (Heritage, 1990; Heritage and Sorjonen, 1992). Others examine how turns are shaped by recipients' activities and are thus, in a literal sense, interactionally constructed (C. Goodwin, 1979, 1981; Lerner, 1991). Still others concentrate on sequential and institutional positioning as it figures in the process by which activities are recognized and understood; we reviewed some of this work in our earlier discussion of indexical expressions and sequential organization (e.g., Schegloff, 1984; Whalen and Zimmerman, 1987; Wilson, 1991).

Despite this attention to sequential components and their assembly, within CA the investigation of sequencing remains the primary focus of attention. By comparison, component production has been only intermittently addressed, often in the context of papers that deal mainly with sequencing, or in papers that use sequential positioning as a way of approaching the problem of component production. Insofar as this problem is taken up, it is addressed in classic CA fashion by way of naturally occurring examples, although these have been analyzed from somewhat different perspectives.[10]

2. Ethnomethodology

We turn now to consider what an ethnomethodological approach, based on contrived demonstrations like the breaching experiments discussed earlier, has to offer. While Garfinkel has not been concerned with sequential organization as such, he does discuss the matter of component production in his "summoning phone" exercise, which seeks to penetrate and decompose the utter familiarity of a ringing telephone. Students are asked to gather tape recordings of ringing phones that are (a) hearably summoning just them, (b) hearably summoning someone else, (c) simulating hearably summoning just them, (d) simulating hearably summoning someone else, and (e) just ringing rather than "summoning." Students are to keep detailed ethnographic notes as to how they made these collections, the conversations they engaged in to achieve their objectives, and so on. A brief explication of this exercise, which demonstrates how "methodic procedures" render lived experience and its intrinsic orderliness into "signed objects" whose interpretation necessarily loses a grasp of such orderliness, is now published in Garfinkel and Wieder (1992). We draw on that paper plus our participation in seminars at the University of Wisconsin when Garfinkel was a visiting professor in 1988 and 1990. While such participation provides a more adequate understanding than does a written account, we hope to harvest several points in the ensuing pages. Interested readers can experience the exercise first-hand by following the instructions outlined in Garfinkel and Wieder (1992), and gain deeper appreciation of the argument.

Products of the exercise include recordings and extensive notes regarding the collection of those recordings. The aim is to recover the "more, other, different" details that are ignored and yet depended upon in the response to a ringing or summoning phone (Garfinkel and Wieder, 1992: 203). Ordinarily these details remain invisible to the participants, but the exercise renders them conspicuous in a surprising way. We wish to consider two examples of

properties that inhere in such seen-but-unnoticed details. First, the *background* from which a phone-ringing emerges depends upon an actor selecting some high-pitched frequency from a heretofore differently constructed ambiance that immediately has the character of silence out of which the just-now hearable phone-ring emerged. That phone-ringing, in other words, is heard via its functional relationship to the prior silence it simultaneously composes as "preceding" the ring (Garfinkel and Wieder, 1992: 195). This aspect of ringing phones is partly revealed by the simulation, where one might call another person to obtain a call-back that "hearably simulates" summoning the originator. In the simulated case there is a moment of anticipation anterior to the first ring, rather than a "preceding silence" composed simultaneously with the onset of ringing. In other words, "waiting-for-the-first-ring-according-to-the-agreement" is a part of the background that distinguishes the simulation from the actual episode, which is revealed to have a taken-for-granted background of "no telling when."

A second property of summoning phones is the *directionality* of the ring. In order to determine whether a phone is "hearably summoning" oneself, the potential answerer seeks to determine where the ring originates. Wherever the hearer might be, he or she seeks to determine if the ringing is coming from close or far, to the right or left, from in front or behind, and so on. As Garfinkel and Wieder (1992: 197) remark:

> Experimental perception studies are thick with demonstrations that the direction from which a sound is heard is a detail with which the listened to sound is recognized and identified as a sounded doing.

The property of directionality, while unnoticed in the daily routine of answering phones, emerges from Garfinkel's exercise as participants begin to distinguish how a phone can be hearably summoning a particular someone -- i.e., either the experimenter or another party. It is partly through imbuing a ringing sound with spatial attributes that one decides what the sound is and whether and how to respond.

When examined for such properties as its background and directionality, the "functional significance" (Gurwitsch, 1964: 114-122) of each summoning phone, or group (such as those "hearably summoning me" vs. those "simulating hearably summoning me") is essentially unique, a quiddity, or, as Garfinkel and Wieder (1992: 202) put it, an "assemblage of haeccities." Such quiddities or haeccities, *along with their structures of detail*, are collapsed, eviscerated, suppressed, or otherwise lost whenever, through some "methodic procedure," such as a recording technology or rule for counting, investigators represent a summoning episode through a depiction, illustration, categorization, classification, description, label, name, or any other "signed object." Signed objects give the original event an "interpreted significance," and it is the bane of analysis to be committed to such interpretation:

> ... the signed object exhibits the episode as a publicly verifiable object; it exhibits the episode's topical elaboration and exhibits what

> the episode's proper topics could be; it exhibits reasoned discourse about the episode; it exhibits the episode's observable, detectable, demonstrable, discourseable rational properties -- i.e., its calculability, its strategic efficacy, just what about it is available to the consequences of its occurrence, its predictability, its reproducibility, etc.; it provides for what the episode's topics as matters of rational discourse could consist of; it provides for the episode's topics specified as data; it exhibits in the foregoing practical aspects the episode's transcendental orderliness; it exhibits the foregoing in established terms for competent members in a natural language. (Garfinkel and Wieder, 1992: 200).

Signed objects are inclusive of terms such as "summonses" and "answers." To refer to a summons-answer sequence, in other words, can hide from analytic appreciation the lived work of participants producing soundings that emerge for them as this or that particular "summons" to be handled in some specific way.

This point, rather than marking a difference between ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, converges with Schegloff's observation that summoning is an "assembled product." What is distinctive about the ethnomethodological approach is, first, a concern to unlock the unseen, the unnoticed, the invisible, but to do so through some contrivance rather than observing naturally occurring processes or records thereof. In this respect, the summoning phones exercise is reminiscent of early ethnomethodological investigative strategies.

The second distinguishing feature, not found in previous ethnomethodological research, is the concept of "unique adequacy." The idea is that the phenomena of everyday life, without exception, already possess whatever methods they require for their own observation, recognition, collection, and analysis (Garfinkel and Wieder, 1992: 182-84). Summonses might be first pair parts that make answers conditionally relevant, and thus serve to initiate a conversational sequence through which participants can coordinate and make accountable their entry into conversation, but those summonses are also phenomena of orderly achievement, with an in vivo coherence and endogenously affiliated methods for assembly and detection as accountably namable objects. The unique adequacy principle also applies to any and all order-productive practices that an ethnomethodologist might identify. Thus, items (a) through (h) on the preceding list of summons-constitutive practices, as well as the "background" and "directionality" of a ringing phone, are themselves glosses for in situ accomplishments involving infinite depths of detail. *Any* principle by which it is possible to analytically order the phenomenal detail of everyday life is a detail of order that recursively permits appreciation of itself as an organized accomplishment. Such accomplishments are recoverable through the analyst's participation as a competent practitioner in and of the phenomenon being studied (Garfinkel and Wieder, 1992: 182).

The ethnomethodological approach has a third feature which distinguishes it from conversation analysis, and that is the posing of an additional topic for investigation. One purpose of the summoning phone exercise, and related exercises, is to penetrate the familiarity of everyday objects to reveal the "developing contexture of recognizable constituent significations" (Garfinkel and Wieder, 1992: 206) which comprise the object as it is embedded in lived experience. Regularly, however, the "skillful, analytic methods" of classic sociological studies turn this structure of detail, this achieved organization -- i.e., lived experience and its intrinsic orderliness -- into signed objects whose interpretation necessarily loses grasp of such orderliness. Classical studies do this in and through a practice that Garfinkel calls "the rendering theorem," which concerns the relationships between (a) the actually-experienced and collaboratively-produced coherence of objects, (b) a methodic procedure for appropriating such coherence into (c) a collection of signs or an account, which gives actual coherence its "interpreted significance" (Garfinkel and Wieder, 1992). While classical studies are necessarily committed to (b) and (c) and thus to *renditions* of social life rather than the actuality of that life, ethnomethodologists confront the work whereby members produce the naturally accountable objects of everyday life (that is, (a) above). But in addition to this topic, ethnomethodologists also examine the rendering theorem itself as an endemic organizational feature of society (cf., Hilbert, 1992). By means of this theorem, members are perpetually engaged in the task of dismissing the lived, embodied work of accomplishing the most ordinary worldly things, including such humble activities as "summoning." Thus, while both ethnomethodology and conversation analysis are concerned with the achieved organization of component activities, only ethnomethodology poses as a topic of order the ubiquity of the rendering theorem as it operates across lay and professional modes of discourse.

As is characteristic of his overall body of work, Garfinkel's summoning phones exercise is vigorously and insistently suggestive in its probing of the ordinariness of an object of common experience. Nevertheless, the form of research portended by this exercise -- and the article in which it is presented (Garfinkel and Wieder, 1992) -- can be elusive. On the one hand, ethnomethodology continues to be cast as a form of empirical inquiry oriented toward a phenomenal domain of order-productive practices. At the same time, specific "policies and methods" appear to pull the enterprise in a more "radical" direction whose contours remain largely unspecified (cf., Pollner, 1991), although it does seem to forestall the accumulation and codification of research findings. For instance, a strict interpretation of the rendering theorem would seem to preclude analysis *in any form*, because that would be a "rendering" and hence incompatible with an enterprise that claims to be confronting the actuality of lived processes -- including processes of rendering -- in particular settings. It is difficult to grasp what form of inquiry might follow from such principles; what its findings might look like; and in what form they might be conveyed to colleagues within a scholarly community. This unresolved tension between what might be termed "social scientific" and "radical" tendencies (cf., Wilson, 1992) is not necessarily cause for alarm, however. It

is precisely this tension that gives ethnomethodology its distinctive intellectual cast, and is arguably responsible for some of the unique insights that ethnomethodology has bequeathed to the social sciences. The insistence on "radical inquiry" is also a reminder that sociological investigation should periodically return to the everyday world to explicate features that cannot be reduced to "practices" or "methods" of whatever sort. As Garfinkel (1988) has argued, organizational features of everyday life require *discovery*, and investigators must be willing to bracket received "methodic procedures" of every sort in order to unearth that which is most fundamental to the orderliness of lived experience.

Conclusion

In tracing the linkages between ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, we have purposely avoided pejorative statements regarding either enterprise. The field is not lacking in such statements; some ethnomethodologists have directed broadsides against the conversation analytic enterprise. Livingston (1987: 85) has criticized the "received" version of conversation analysis, Lynch and Bogen (1990) object to conversation analytic "foundationalism," and Garfinkel and Wieder (1992: 201) refer to "canonical" conversation analysis. We know of no comparable conversation analytic criticisms of ethnomethodology, although a reading of the literature might suggest that conversation analysts, by selective citations, at times neglect the ethnomethodological groundwork to which they are indebted. To the extent that they exist, we think the broadsides and neglect are unnecessary and counterproductive, for they obfuscate important interrelationships. Making explicit these interrelationships -- in theory, in method, and in substance -- helps to distinguish both endeavors from conventional social scientific practice and facilitates recognition of the ways in which each endeavor offers progressive insights into the foundations of social organization.

Specifying interrelationships also helps define the relative strengths of each mode of investigation and suggests what can be yielded from complementary studies. To be sure, ethnomethodology provides an impetus for exploring radical phenomena, but with the exception of recent studies in a particular substantive domain -- namely, work in the discovering sciences (e.g., Bjelic and Lynch, 1992; Garfinkel, Lynch, and Livingston, 1981; Lynch, 1982; 1985) -- practitioners have had difficulty in advancing a coherent program for explicating these phenomena. As Garfinkel and his colleagues publish work that has existed primarily in lecture form, however, this state of affairs will undoubtedly change. For its part, conversation analysis has established a focused and productive research program based in part on ethnomethodological principles, and has generated substantive findings which build upon one another in a cumulative manner and which have had considerable influence on cognate disciplines (Heritage, 1987: 256). This is due in part to the remarkable "teachability" of conversation analysis, which does provide an almost paradigmatic array of data-gathering methods, analytic

techniques, and exemplars for research, including the conversational foundation with which to specify constitutive procedures in and of various institutional settings.[11] Admittedly, any inquiry that sets a definitive trajectory, such as examining sequential organization, does run the risk that Livingston (1987: 78) has discussed as "objectifying" conversational structures. This tendency can be avoided with more emphasis on investigating sequential component production along the lines of Schegloff's early work on summonses, and more generally by retaining a continuing ethnomethodological sense of the "more and other" to sequences and other practices of talk-in-interaction. Otherwise, there is a danger of rendering the actuality of spoken interaction as "signed objects" which forestall further inquiry into interactants' constitutive practices. However, ethnomethodology is also susceptible to this tendency; inquiry can involve endless rediscoveries of essential phenomena, such as "reflexivity," "indexicality," "local historicity," and the "rendering theorem," so that ostensibly ethnomethodological investigations furnish produced objects with an "interpreted significance" rather than documenting the various indigenous methods of their achievement.

If ethnomethodology and conversation analysis face similar dangers, and assuming that both are empirical enterprises seeking to explicate a domain or domains of organizational phenomena, it would seem that there is much to be gained by explicit recognition of the potential for complementarity (e.g., Whalen, 1992; this volume). The overriding objective is to advance our knowledge of the inner workings of social life, and superior research in either area transcends the limitations of received concepts and established ways of working in pursuit of this goal. In proposing a complementarity between ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, we are far from suggesting a formal synthesis or from intimating that they are different "perspectives" on the "same" domain of social facts.[12] We simply mean that, without a conversation analytic branch, ethnomethodology might miss the opportunity for a directed line of inquiry and a focus that provides sustenance for at least some who carry a genuine commitment to the ethnomethodological sensibility and seek a way of actualizing it systematically. Without attending to its ethnomethodological roots, however, conversation analysis might overlook subtle and yet crucial aspects of interactional organization. In short, if we can continue the botanical metaphor, conversation analysis without ethnomethodology risks proliferating findings that are detached from their roots in members' ongoing constitutive activities. Ethnomethodology without its conversation analytic branches risks becoming root-bound, probing ever more deeply into the autochthonous ordering of society, but lacking an analytic apparatus that reaches for the sky.

1   We discuss the implications of "On Formal Structures of Practical Action" (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970) below.

2   For more extended general discussions of ethnomethodology, see Boden (1990), Heritage (1984; 1987), Livingston (1987), Maynard and Clayman (1991), Sharrock and Anderson (1986), and Wilson and Zimmerman (1980). For discussions of conversation analysis in particular, see ten Have (1990), Heritage (1984: Chapter 8), Lee (1987), Whalen (1990), and Zimmerman (1988).

3   The Schutzian inspiration is most prominent in Garfinkel's early discussion of the breaching experiments (see Garfinkel, 1963), where the latter are presented as designed to violate specific assumptions of the natural attitude of everyday life as outlined by Schutz (e.g., the assumption of the congruency of relevances, the interchangeability of standpoints, etc.). However, when Garfinkel discusses these experiments several years later in his book (1967: Chapter 2), Schutz figures less prominently in the discussion. Although Gurwitsch is not cited in that chapter, his influence is broadly acknowledged in the preface (1967: ix).

4   On the distinction between causal/statistical laws and conversation analytic structures, see Heritage (1984: 245-53). In a somewhat different vein, see Coulter's (1983) discussion of the distinction between the "logical" structures of CA and the "contingent" structures derived from statistical or distributional investigations.

5   As one final example, consider Goodwin's (1986) analysis of gestures that are often paired with prototypical indexical or deictic terms such as "this" or "that." Through such pairings, a speaker can solicit the gaze of a recipient who is looking elsewhere. Once again, indexical expressions turn out to be significant for the maintenance of mutual involvement of an ongoing course of interaction.

6   For the possibility that such utterances are "micro events" that can comprise what Collins (1981) refers to as "interaction ritual chains," see Hilbert (1990). For an alternative view which is more appreciative of the autonomous ordering of utterances, see Rawls (1989).

7   See our earlier discussion of how adjacency pairs are realized when second pair parts are not initially forthcoming.

8   Systematic absences are somewhat different from what have been called "official absences" within CA (Schegloff, 1968: 1083ff). An item is "officially absent" when its nonoccurrence is noticed and explicitly oriented-to by the interactional coparticipants. By contrast, an item can be characterized as "systematically absent" when the investigator can: 1) formally characterize the sequential environment at hand, 2) show that the item in question regularly

occurs at that sequential juncture in other situations, and 3) show that in the present class of situations the item is regularly withheld.

[9]   Discussion of components such as those on the following list can be found in Schegloff (1968, 1970, 1986). The list of examples was also informed by taped and written comments of participants in seminars on ethnomethodology and conversation analysis at the University of Wisconsin.

[10]   For example, see Zimmerman's (1984) analysis and Schegloff's (1991) rejoinder.

[11]   For a general discussion of this point, see Drew and Heritage (1992), Heritage (1984: 280-290; 1987: 261), and Zimmerman and Boden (1991). For a sampling of empirical work, see Atkinson and Drew (1979), Clayman (1989), Greatbatch (1988), Maynard (1991), and Whalen and Zimmerman (1987).

[12]   For a penetrating critique of such perspectivism, see Watson and Sharrock (1991).